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How the CERCLA Notification Requirements
Facilitate the Creation of Brownfields and
What EPA Can Do to Address this Problem
by Larry Schnapf*

T

Introduction

hree decades after the passage of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),1 this country is still adding to its
inventory of contaminated sites. Many of these contaminated
properties have been transferred or sold a number of times since
CERCLA was passed, yet regulators have not been notified of
the environmental conditions uncovered during due diligence.
Regulators and community officials often only learn about contamination after the owner has filed for bankruptcy or abandoned
the property—leaving the taxpayers to pay for the cleanups.
This article argues that the CERCLA reporting obligations
and similar state laws contribute to creating and delaying remediation of brownfields, and proposes administrative solutions
that EPA could adopt to accelerate the pace of cleanups and
allow the public to access information about the potential risks
posed by sites in their communities.

Overview of CERCLA
CERCLA was enacted to address the problems associated
with improper disposal of hazardous substances. The statute
imposes strict and joint liability on four categories of potentially
responsible parties (“PRPs”) and provides the federal government with sweeping authority. To establish liability under CERCLA, a plaintiff must show that there has been:
• a release2
• of a hazardous substance3
• from a facility4
• that has resulted in the response costs that were incurred
consistent with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (“NCP”).5

Government CERCLA Response Authority
Under section 104 of CERCLA, EPA has broad investigatory powers to inspect sites where there may be a release
or threatened release, to obtain information about the materials
at the site, to determine the nature of the release, to evaluate
the ability of the facility’s owner to pay for a cleanup, and to
copy records or documents.6 Under CERCLA section 105, EPA
is authorized to compile a list of sites that it believes pose the
greatest danger.7 These sites are placed on the National Priorities
List (“NPL”), also known as the Superfund List, which is published as Appendix B to the NCP.8 There are three ways that a
site may be listed on the NPL. The principal method is by investigating and evaluating the danger posed by the release using
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the Hazardous Ranking System (“HRS”), which is attached to
the NCP as Appendix A.9 Sites that do not score high enough
on the HRS may also be placed on the NPL if a state where the
site is located designates that site as the top priority site in that
state, presenting the greatest danger to the public health or the
environment.10 Finally, a site may be added to the NPL if: 1) the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (“ATSDR”)
issues a “public health advisory” recommending that individuals be isolated from the release of hazardous substances; 2) the
EPA determines that the release poses a significant threat to the
public; and 3) that a remedial action will be more cost effective
than removal action.11
When EPA first learns that a release of hazardous substances may have occurred at a facility, the release and the
facility may be recorded in the CERCLA Information System
(“CERCLIS”), a database that EPA has developed to inventory
and manage sites where releases of hazardous substances are
known to have occurred.12 However, adding a site to CERCLIS
does not represent a finding of liability for a particular party or
a determination that a response action is necessary.13 An NPL
listing is not, by itself, a determination of CERCLA liability nor
does it require site owners or operators to undertake response
actions. Moreover, the EPA may undertake a removal action and
pursue enforcement actions against PRPs even when the site is
not on the NPL. However, Superfund‑financed remedial actions
may not be undertaken unless the site is on the NPL.14 Private
parties may pursue cost recovery and contribution actions even
for non-NPL sites.
To determine if a site should be placed on the NPL using the
HRS, EPA will first take the site through a two-stage site assessment. The first step is a preliminary assessment (“PA”) which
consists of an office review of the existing information on the
site and possibly a visual observation of the site. The second step
is a site investigation (“SI”), where more detailed information
is collected, including soil and groundwater sampling.15 Nearly
half of the CERCLIS sites that are evaluated are eliminated
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from further consideration after the PA. If the EPA determines
that a site does not require further investigation, a “No Further
Response Action Planned” (“NFRAP”) designation will be
placed in CERCLIS for that site which means that no additional
actions will be taken by the federal government under CERCLA
unless additional information becomes available which suggests
more investigatory steps are warranted at the site.16 It is important to understand that NFRAP designation does not necessarily
mean a hazard does not exist but simply that EPA does not plan
to take any action based on the available information. A NFRAP
determination does not preclude a state from initiating enforcement action under its own environmental laws. Indeed, a small
percentage of NFA sites do eventually become active CERCLIS
sites after EPA notifies states of an NFRAP decision. If a site
receives a HRS score of 28.5 or more, EPA will place the site
on the NPL using the process required under the Administrative
Procedures Act for promulgating regulations. The NPL must be
revised annually. The procedure that EPA usually follows is that
it will first propose placing a group of sites on the NPL. This
notice of proposed inclusion on the NPL will be published in the
Federal Register. Then, after a public comment period, EPA will
issue a final rule in the Federal Register formally adding sites to
the NPL. Listing of a site on the NPL may be challenged only
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Petitions
challenging the listing of a site must be filed within ninety days
of the final notice to list the site on the NPL.
Many states are increasingly reluctant to add contaminated sites to the NPL due to their concerns that listed sites may
become stigmatized and scare away developers. In response to
this concern, Congress authorized EPA under the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (“2002
CERCLA Amendments”) to make a determination to defer
final listing of an “eligible response site” on the NPL if a state
requests the deferral under certain circumstances.17
The federal government is authorized to perform cleanups
known as response actions18 and then may seek to recover its costs
against PRPs.19 The federal government may also seek injunctive
relief by ordering PRPs to perform response actions for hazardous
substance releases that pose “imminent and substantial endangerment” to human health or the environment.20 Private parties and
states that incur response costs may also seek to recover those
costs either in cost recovery actions21 or contribution actions.22

CERCLA Liable Parties and Liability Defenses
The four categories of PRPs are: 1) past and current owners of
facilities and vessels (i.e., tanks, equipment, etc.);23 2) past and current operators of facilities and vessels;24 3) generators of hazardous
substances;25 and 4) transporters of hazardous substances.26
A party may avoid CERCLA liability by asserting one of the
CERCLA affirmative defenses such as the third party defense,27
the innocent landowner (“ILO”),28 bona fide prospective purchaser (“BFPP”),29 and contiguous property owner (“CPO”)30
defenses. To assert the third party defense, a defendant must
establish that:
• the release was caused solely by a third party;
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• the third party was not an employee or agent of the defendant, or the acts or omissions of the third party did not occur
in connection with a direct or indirect “contractual relationship” with the defendant;
• the defendant exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances; and
• the defendant took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of the third party.31
CERCLA does not indicate what types of actions would
constitute the exercise of “due care” that would satisfy the third
party defense. The legislative history indicates that a person
must demonstrate that its actions were consistent with those that
a “reasonable and prudent person would have taken in light of
all relevant facts and circumstances.”32 The due care requirement has been interpreted to include “those steps necessary
to protect the public from a health or environmental threat.”33
Because a person’s actions will be evaluated based on the
“relevant facts and circumstances,” the due care analysis is a
fact-intensive inquiry and will be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.34 In one such case, a shopping center was able to demonstrate that it exercised due care because it took steps such as
maintaining water filters, sampling drinking water, instructing
tenants to avoid discharging into the septic system, inserting use
restrictions into leases, and conducting periodic inspections.35
In contrast, parties who did not take any affirmative measures
have been held to have failed to satisfy their due care obligations.36 Some courts have even held that a party who does not
inquire about past environmental practices failed to exercise the
requisite due care necessary to assert the defense, on the grounds
that Congress intended CERCLA to provide incentives for private parties to investigate potential sources of contamination and
initiate remediation efforts.37 As part of this line of cases, some
courts have held that CERCLA “does not sanction willful or
negligent blindness.”38
The ILO liability exemption excludes from the definition
of “contractual relationship” a person who, at the time they
acquired the facility, did not know and had no reason to know
that any past or current release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at the facility.39 To establish that it did not know
or had no reason to know of the contamination, a defendant must
demonstrate that it took “appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability.”40 Since the innocent purchaser defense is technically a part
of the third party defense, a landowner would still have to satisfy the due care and precautionary elements of the third party
defense.41 In addition, the landowner must demonstrate that it
exercised appropriate care by taking reasonable steps to stop
any continuing releases, prevent threatened future releases, and
prevent or limit any human, environmental, or natural resource
exposure to previously released hazardous substances.42
The BFPP liability protection applies to purchasers (and
tenants) that acquired ownership or possession of property after
January 11, 2002.43 A person may knowingly acquire contaminated property under the BFPP defense if the party conducts an
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“all appropriate inquiry” prior to acquisition and complies with
certain post-closing “continuing obligations,” including the
exercise of appropriate care with respect to a previously released
hazardous substance.44
Owners or operators of properties impacted by off-site
releases may be able to assert the CPO if they can establish
that they conducted an all appropriate inquiry when they first
acquired the property and still did not know or have reason to
know that it was or could be contaminated. In addition, the owners of affected property seeking to invoke the CPO must also
demonstrate compliance with their “continuing obligations”
after taking title to the affected property, including taking reasonable steps to stop continuing releases, preventing future
threatened release and otherwise preventing or limiting exposure
to a hazardous substance released on or from property owned by
that person.45
Under EPA’s 2003 “Common Elements Guidance,”46 the
agency indicated that the “due care” case law of the CERCLA
third party defense provides a reference point for evaluating the
“reasonable steps” and appropriate care requirements.47 The
guidance goes on to state that when courts have examined the
due care requirement in the context of the pre-existing innocent
landowner defense, they have generally concluded that a landowner should take some positive or affirmative step(s) when
confronted with hazardous substances on its property.48 Based
on the similarity of the concepts, the kinds of actions that owners
and operators of properties must take to satisfy the “reasonable
steps/appropriate care” obligations of the ILO, BFPP, and CPO
liability protections will probably be similar to those required
under the “due care” obligation of the third party defense.

CERCLA Reporting Obligations
Section 103(a) of CERCLA provides that any person
in charge of a vessel or facility shall immediately notify the
National Response Center as soon as the person has knowledge
of a release of hazardous substances that exceeds the reportable
quantities (“RQ”) promulgated by EPA.49 The primary purpose
of the notification obligation is to inform the federal government
of potentially serious releases of hazardous substances so that it
can determine if a response is necessary and evaluate the adequacy of any cleanup action implemented by others.50
When EPA first developed its RQs, the agency decided to
use a 24-hour period for determining if a reportable release had
occurred.51 The statute did not mandate this approach. Instead,
EPA adopted the 24-hour RQ because this approach was used
for section 311 of the Clean Water Act52 and the agency as well
as the regulated community had experience with this framework.
This framework made sense in the early 1980s, when improper
management of hazardous waste was rampant. However, management practices have improved significantly since then, and
the principal concern now is not new discharges but the threat
posed by the thousands of sites that have historical contamination from past practices. Yet, because the notification obligation
is linked to the RQs, the presence of historical contamination
exceeding applicable standards may not be reportable. Owners
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and sellers of historically contaminated property often take the
position that they have no obligation to disclose the contamination because they do not know if the contamination was a result
of a release that exceeded the RQ or simply the result of de minimis leaking over an extended period. Moreover, because the
reporting obligation is limited to a “person in charge,” potential
purchasers of property have no obligation to report contamination discovered during due diligence. In essence, EPA has created a “don’t look, don’t tell” policy that encourages parties not
to report historical contamination. However, without accurate
information about the existence or extent of contamination, regulators cannot effectively administer their remedial programs or
protect communities from unacceptable risks.
The problem with the structure of the release reporting
requirements is not limited to the CERCLA program. Nearly
all states have adopted their own CERCLA-like programs and
the overwhelming majority of cleanups in this country are performed under state remedial programs. Not surprisingly, most
states have followed the CERCLA RQ approach for reporting
obligations.
Remedial programs are built upon self-reporting, but market forces discourage parties from volunteering adverse environmental information. As rational economic actors, property
owners are loathe to generate information about environmental
conditions much less share that information with other parties,
since they are uncertain what the sampling will reveal and how
it may impact asset values. Moreover, if the buyer walks away
from the transaction, the owner will not only lose a sale, but
also face an accelerated cleanup obligation without the benefit
of the sale’s proceeds to fund the cleanup. Finally, owners are
concerned that tort liability could arise from disclosure.
Mainstream economic theory assumes that all participants
have equal access to materially important information. However, because contamination is usually not easily discoverable
and information about contamination is costly to obtain, contaminated properties operate in a distorted market. Often, the
seller possesses superior or private knowledge about the environmental conditions.
Some academics and government regulators have expressed
the view that reporting obligations are not a problem because a
buyer can always require a seller to disclose or cleanup a site.
However, this view ignores the practical market reality that buyers often do not have the leverage to extract such concessions,
and may not realize that they need such information or that they
may even want to know. In the absence of a regulatory driver,
sellers often employ “no look” contracts that contractually prohibit the buyer from further investigating or disclosing contamination. Since the buyer will only be compelled to remediate the
site if the regulator becomes aware of the contamination, the
buyer has little incentive to voluntarily clean up the site. In the
meantime, the unknown contamination can migrate from a site
and expose the community to unknown risks.
The conventional narrative has been that it was concerns
over CERCLA liability that led to the creation of brownfields because purchasers and lenders were concerned about
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

remediation costs. However, the reality is far more complex and
intertwined with the economic dislocations and globalization
over the past three decades. The primary reason for the creation
of brownfields was that property owners were allowed to abandon sites without first being required to remediate them.53 If the
CERCLA reporting obligations required historical contamination to be disclosed, many of these viable companies that relocated their operations would have been forced to remediate the
facilities at that time. It is impossible to say how much of the
$14 billion in brownfield funding that EPA has awarded in the
past fifteen years would have been necessary if the CERCLA
reporting obligations applied to historical contamination, though
we do know that many contaminated sites were abandoned in the
past two decades—well after the passage of CERCLA. Indeed,
it appears that EPA does not track or maintain information on
whether brownfield funding is being used for sites with viable
responsible parties. By not pursuing responsible parties for the
costs of the assessment and cleanup grants, EPA has actually
created a moral hazard by incentivizing companies to continue
to abandon their old and contaminated facilities.54

New Perils from Old Releases
The HRS scoring system is heavily weighted towards contaminated groundwater that is used for drinking water purposes.
Groundwater in urban areas is often impacted from former commercial uses and long-forgotten underground storage tanks.
Because urban groundwater is typically not used for potable
purposes, regulators have usually allowed responsible parties to
leave contaminated water at a site, as long as institutional controls are recorded to prevent the groundwater from being used.55
Indeed, many local governments have enacted ordinances that
prohibit the use of groundwater to help reduce the cleanup costs
and encourage reuse of contaminated properties.
Because of the RQ approach for release notification, the
discovery of contaminated groundwater in urban areas is frequently not reported to regulatory agencies. As a result, there
are scores of what are known as “rogue plumes” in urban areas
that environmental lawyers may be aware of from due diligence,
but have not been reported to regulators or do not appear on any
databases of known releases. If the drinking water pathway is
the only pathway for exposure to these unknown plumes, then
the existence of these plumes would not pose a significant risk
to human health. However, during the past decade, federal and
state regulators have learned that residual contaminants in soil
and groundwater can act as source for contaminated vapors to
migrate into building structures.56 Scientists and regulators now
realize that the behavior of contaminated vapors in the subsurface, which is known as “vapor intrusion,”57 is far more complex
than previously understood and the potential for vapors migrating into buildings may be far greater than previously assumed.
As a result, these unreported groundwater plumes might be
causing the accumulation of unacceptable levels of contaminated vapors in occupied buildings.
Moreover, because the concentrations of contaminated
vapors that can trigger remedial obligations are extremely low,
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unacceptable levels of vapors may be present in a building from
releases that do not exceed reportable quantities.58 To combat
the risk posed by “rogue plumes,” New York adopted legislation that requires responsible parties to notify adjacent property
owners if vapor intrusion sampling detects concentrations above
acceptable thresholds.59 The owners, in turn, are required to
share the results with their tenants.60

Proposed Administrative Amendments
During the past fifteen years, EPA and states have increasingly relied on their brownfield and voluntary cleanup programs to remediate contaminated sites. These programs are
essentially a market-based approach to remediation, where the
market decides which sites have sufficient value to remediate.
While these state programs have encouraged the remediation
of contaminated sites, they are not robust enough to substantially whittle down the nation’s inventory of such sites. Studies have estimated that there are between one quarter and one
million contaminated sites in the country.61 Many of these sites
and the risks they pose are unknown. Yet, according to a study
by the Northeast-Midwest Institute, approximately six to seven
thousand sites were cleaned annually prior to 2006.62 Even at
the height of the real estate bubble from 2007 to 2008, the pace
may have increased to ten thousand remediated sites annually.
Clearly, if we continue to rely primarily on the current incremental market-based approach in addressing these sites, the
inventory of contaminated legacy sites will not be cleaned up for
another generation.
Given the sharp decline in the real estate market, communities should not have to wait years for conditions to improve
before their sites are cleaned up. One way to accelerate the
pace of cleanups is to impose a mandatory obligation on property owners to investigate suspected releases and disclose the
existence of contamination that exceeds unrestricted cleanup
standards. Because contamination can impact human health
and public resources, information about contamination should
be regulated as a public good that should not be hidden behind
archaic notions of caveat emptor. EPA could implement this
recommendation by adopting one or more of the following
administrative reforms.

Revise Reportable Quantity To Eliminate the
24-Hour Period
EPA could close the historic contamination loophole by
eliminating the 24-hour period from its section 103(a) reporting
obligations. Instead, contamination would have to be disclosed
if it exceeds applicable soil or groundwater standards. Once
this information is in the public domain, decisions can be made
about who is responsible for cleanup. Many current landowners
or prospective purchasers who discover historical contamination
would be able to assert a liability defense. Indeed, disclosure
could be the quid pro quo for the liability relief.
The CERCLA legislative history indicated that EPA has
broad authority to revise the reporting requirements if underreporting was occurring.63 Because delays in reporting could exacerbate an already serious condition, Congress said EPA should
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err on the side of protecting human health and the environment
when administering this authority.64
The current RQ reporting framework has contributed to the
proliferation of so-called “self-directed” or “at-risk” cleanups
where parties perform cleanups without any regulatory oversight.65 Developers and property owners concerned about the
costs and time delays associated with regulatory oversight often
simply remediate contamination that is uncovered during construction activities, and use their own environmental consultants
or in-house staff to determine when the spill has been adequately
remediated.66 Frequently, these clean-ups do not involve sampling soil or groundwater to determine the true extent of the contamination, but simply removing the visibly contaminated soil
and then covering it with a new building foundation or parking lot.67 In doing so, the developer or owner is betting that the
understaffed regulatory agency will not learn about the contamination and if it does, the development will have been completed
and the regulator will not take any action. Without regulatory
oversight, there can be no assurance that the cleanup was adequately performed and that the site does not pose unacceptable
risks to human health.
Some might argue that enhanced disclosure will discourage redevelopment of contaminated properties, thereby pushing
development to undeveloped land, or “greenfields.” However,
many states and local governments have countered this potential threat by adopting “smart growth” initiatives that make it
increasingly difficult to build on undeveloped sites.68
Others might also assert that mandatory reporting will
stigmatize properties. This rationale has often been used to
discourage purchasers from reporting or investigating historical contamination. While the contamination goes unreported, it
might also migrate and later become an NPL site because the
contamination was not addressed earlier. However, there are
plenty of opportunistic investors who are willing to purchase
contaminated sites that their proprietary models tell them are
undervalued. Indeed, empirical information from the New York
Brownfield Cleanup Program indicates that cleanup costs are
only one to five percent of the potential redevelopment value—
with most of the sites around one percent.69 Often, the remediation costs are simply a “delta” over the construction costs.70
In addition, several states have established reporting obligations
that do not use the RQ approach and many states impose affirmative obligations on owners or operators of underground storage
tanks to investigate suspected releases.71 There is no evidence
that these disclosure schemes have disrupted the real estate markets in those states.72
The structure of the CERCLA reporting obligations allows
many sellers of corporate property to keep the presence of contamination secret. In the absence of a regulatory driver, the
owner-seller can then contractually prohibit the buyer from disclosing the contamination unless an overburdened regulatory
agency somehow stumbles across the contamination. Indeed,
transactional documents often contain a so-called “No Look”
or “No Hunt” clause that prevents the buyer from conducting
further investigations on the property if the purchaser wants to
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maintain contractual protections obtained from the seller.73 In
fact, it is not uncommon for environmental lawyers to spend a
significant amount of time negotiating and drafting what and
how contamination information should be disclosed.
The excuses for maintaining the current “hide the ball” trick
do not stand up under any analysis. Mandatory disclosure would
level the playing field among known contaminated sites and
unknown contaminated sites, while eliminating the moral hazard
created by the current approach. Currently, property owners who
disclose historical contamination because of corporate aspirational goals are at a disadvantage since the sites with unreported
contamination and therefore thought to be clean, are comparatively overvalued. Furthermore, if the buyer walks away from a
disclosed property, the seller is still obligated to clean up the site
under either CERCLA or a state brownfield program. Once the
contamination is disclosed, the risk posed by the contamination
can be assessed and sellers will be forced to either remediate
sites or convey the property at discount to encourage a buyer
willing to remediate the sites as part of a redevelopment plan.
One way or the other, the site will be remediated without the
need to spend public funds.
Mandatory disclosure could also encourage buyers to perform more thorough due diligence actions since the information
will be available at a more cost-effective price and the information could be used to gain an advantage during the negotiations.
Furthermore, greater disclosure will facilitate lending since
uncertainty over environmental risks will be reduced.
The federal Emergency Planning and Community Right
to Know Act (“EPCRA”) and California’s Proposition 65 law
serve as examples of the environmental benefits that inure for
the public when greater disclosure is required. When EPCRA
was enacted in 1986, commentators warned that the information would result in a wave of litigation. Not only did the dramatic increase in toxic tort lawsuits never materialize, but also
the disclosures motivated facilities to substantially reduce their
emissions.74 Likewise, Proposition 65 has been credited with
causing companies to significantly lower the content of dangerous chemicals in their products.75
Recognizing the mischief that the current RQ framework
allows, a number of states have recently begun to move away
from the RQ approach.76 For example, the Maryland Department of Environment (“MDE”) has proposed new reporting
obligations that are targeted to the discovery of “historical contamination.”77 Under this proposed rule, any responsible party
in possession of sampling data or other environmental assessment that indicates the presence of a release of a hazardous
substance into the environment above an applicable standard
must immediately report the information to the MDE.78 The
proposed rule emphasizes that the reporting obligation is triggered even if the responsible party cannot link the information
to any known release or discharge.79 In addition, Connecticut
has proposed amendments to its reporting obligations that would
impose notification obligations for past releases based on a number of factors including proximity to sensitive receptors, as well
as the nature of the material released and the threat it poses.80
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Washington state enacted legislation that extended its residential
disclosure requirements to commercial properties.81
To further encourage property owners to disclose historical contamination, EPA could adopt an amnesty program for
property owners who voluntarily disclose contamination within
one year of the reforms, much like what EPA has done with its
audit policy.82 Property owners who voluntarily disclose their
sites would be treated as Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers
(“BFPP”), provided they did not cause the contamination and
would only be responsible for complying with appropriate care/
continuing obligations, and the sites do not pose an imminent
and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment. Owners could take actions such as installing vapor intrusion mitigation systems to cut off human exposures, and remove
floating products or grossly contaminated soils that serve as a
source of groundwater contamination.

Clarify Guidance on Reporting Obligations Under
103(c)
Section 103(c) contains a notification requirement that is a
separate and distinct reporting obligation.83 This section required
that owners or operators notify EPA by June 9, 1981 of the existence and location of facilities where hazardous waste had been
stored, treated, or disposed of prior to December 1980, unless
the facility obtained interim status under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).84 Persons who knowingly
failed to comply with this notification obligation were precluded
from asserting any of the affirmative defenses contained in section 107 of CERCLA.85
EPA’s 1981 guidance indicated the reporting obligations
applied to inactive facilities that did not previously file a notice
under RCRA section 3010 and that frequent spills or leakage
over a period of years could create de facto disposal facilities
that would be subject to the 103(c) notification requirement.86
EPA subsequently issued three interpretative documents indicating that the reporting obligation under 103(c) was not a single
time obligation but was a “lasting” obligation when an owner or
operator discovered pre-1981 disposal.87 The only reported decision involving 103(c) appears to be City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc.88 As part of its claim under the citizen suit
provision CERCLA section 310, the plaintiff asserted the defendant (former owner) failed to comply with section 103(c).89 In dismissing this count, the court ruled that section 103(c) imposed a
one-time reporting obligation that had expired on June 9, 1981.90
Since the violation was a wholly past violation, the plaintiff could
not maintain an action under section 310.91
The court did not address whether the reporting requirement could apply to landowners, purchasers, or operators who
discover the existence of pre-1981 hazardous waste after June
9, 1981. Moreover, since 103(c) imposes an affirmative duty on
owners and operators to examine reasonably available records,
failure to review reasonably available records that could have
shown or prevented a release of hazardous substances might be
construed to be a failure to exercise due care or appropriate care
necessary to assert the landowner liability protections.92
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EPA should reaffirm its earlier guidance that section 103(c)
imposes a continuous reporting obligation on owners or operators of facilities but allow such parties a one-year amnesty to
disclose such historical hazardous waste activity without incurring any penalties so long as they are not active polluters.

Issue Guidance on section 111(g)
Section 111(g) required EPA to promulgate regulations
requiring owners or operators of facilities where there has been
a release of hazardous substances to provide notice to persons
potentially injured parties by such releases of a hazardous substance.93 Until the regulations were issued, owners or operators of a facility or vessel were required to “provide reasonable
notice to potential injured parties by publication in local newspapers serving the affected area” of a hazardous substances release
from that facility or vessel.94 In the preamble to its 103(a) regulations, EPA stated that the 111(g) notification was independent
from the reporting requirements of section 103(a).95
EPA has never proposed or promulgated any regulations
under section 111(g). Just as EPA is correcting its omission to
issue financial assurance regulations under section 108,96 EPA
should promulgate regulations under 111(g) if it declines to
revise the 103(a) RQs.

Revise All Appropriate Inquires to Require
Sampling of Releases
In 1986, Congress added the ILO defense, which was actually a subset of the third party defense.97 The ILO provides that a
person would not be considered to be in a “contractual relationship” (one of the four elements of the third party defense) if the
owner performed an “appropriate inquiry” into the past uses of
the property and as a result of that inquiry did not know or have
any reason to know of releases of hazardous substances.98 Courts
were instructed to consider the following factors in evaluating if
the owner satisfied the ILO: 1) any specialized knowledge or
expertise of the defendant, owner; 2) if the purchase price indicated awareness of the presence of a risk of contamination, commonly known, or reasonable information about the property; 3)
the obviousness of the presence of contamination at the property; and 4) the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.99 The case law interpreting what might be called
“little all appropriate inquiries” (“aai”) has not been uniform,
but a preponderance of cases have held that a party must at least
perform some sampling to qualify as an ILO.100
When CERCLA was amended in 2002, Congress added
the BFPP and CPO defenses and modified the ILO (collectively
the “Landowner Liability Protections” or “LLPs”).101 As part
of these amendments, Congress added five criteria to the “aai”
factors and instructed EPA to promulgate a rule based on those
ten factors,102 which was called the All Appropriate Inquiries
(“AAI”) rule.
When EPA promulgated its AAI rule, the agency said a purchaser did not have to conduct sampling but simply had to identify if there were any releases to comply with AAI.103 Thus, if a
purchaser learned of a release during its investigation but did not
disclose or remediate the release, it would still be considered to
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have performed an all appropriate inquiry. EPA felt that sampling
should be related to compliance with the post-closing continuing
obligations.104 However, EPA did acknowledge that sampling
might be appropriate in some cases, such as to plug data gaps.105
EPA also suggested that a court could conclude that sampling
should have been conducted, depending on the obviousness of the
contamination and the ability to detect the contamination.106
EPA should revise the language of AAI to incorporate an
affirmative obligation to sample suspected releases identified in
phase one investigation. If a phase two investigation identifies
contamination above cleanup standards, the information would
then have to be disclosed. If an owner wants to qualify for one of
the LLPs, the quid pro quo should be disclosure of the results of
due diligence so that regulators can decide if and how to address
the contamination. To motivate owners to disclose the information, EPA should borrow from its audit policy and only require
owners to comply with continuing obligations if they were not
an active polluter. Thus, even if the deal fell through, the owner
would be rewarded for disclosing the due diligence results.
Some have suggested that such mandatory sampling and
disclosure would frustrate the purposes of the 2002 CERCLA
Amendments to encourage redevelopment of brownfields. However, Congress actually added to the obligations of landowners
when it modified “aai” and created the continuing obligations.107
Moreover, when enacting CERCLA, Congress deliberately cast
a wide liability net to protect human health and the environment.
In promulgating AAI, EPA appeared to have lost sight of the
principal goal of CERCLA. It seems to have focused more on
protecting property owners and not enough on protecting local
communities by providing them with timely information about
conditions identified in phase one and phase two reports.
Objective data on how well AAI is facilitating cleanups is
scarce. Unfortunately, EPA does not track the number of cleanups performed under state brownfield programs but only cleanups completed by EPA Brownfields grantees. Thus, we only
have anecdotal accounts that are generally used to support unexamined assumptions about the impact of disclosure on transactions. We know from industry sources that the average number
of phase one reports during the past seventeen years ranged from
200,000 to 250,000 annually. However, we do not know how
many of those reports identified releases, how many such reports
proceeded to phase two reports, and how many of those then
proceeded to cleanups. Such data could help EPA evaluate the
effectiveness of its brownfield program and AAI.

Require States to Adopt the New Reporting
Obligations to Qualify as a “State Response
Program” Under Section 129
Unlike other environmental laws, CERCLA does not provide for the delegation of CERCLA authority to states.108
Indeed, state brownfield programs proliferated in the 1990s
largely in response to the perceived liability concerns posed by
CERCLA. Even with these state initiatives, brownfield developers and their lenders remained concerned that EPA might determine that a site cleanup performed under a state program was
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inadequate. This fear of federal enforcement is probably more
theoretical than real since brownfield sites are not as seriously
contaminated as NPL sites and are therefore usually not on the
federal enforcement radar screen.
To address this concern, the 2002 CERCLA Amendments
added a new section 128 to CERCLA that bars EPA from bringing enforcement actions under CERCLA when a cleanup is
performed at an “eligible response site” and the state response
program meets the minimum standards established in this section.109 An “eligible response site” under section 128 includes
sites that fall within the definition of a brownfield site and those
sites that EPA determines are eligible for brownfield financial
assistance on a case-by-case basis.110 Sites specifically excluded
from this definition are NPL sites, as well as sites where EPA
has conducted or is conducting a preliminary assessment and
site inspection and determines, after consulting with the state,
that the preliminary score of the site makes it eligible for inclusion on the NPL.111 However, if EPA determines not to take
any further action, the property may be classified as an eligible
response site.112 In addition, a site that pose a threat to a “solesource drinking water aquifer or a sensitive ecosystem” may not
be considered an “eligible response site.”113
Congress did not impose any extensive standards for state
response programs in order for the federal enforcement bar to
apply at eligible response sites. The only state program requirement is that a state maintains an inventory of sites where response
actions have been completed in the previous year and that are
planned in the upcoming year.114 Specifically, the inventory
must be updated at least annually and be made available to the
public.115 Each site must be identified by name and location.116
The inventory must also indicate if a site will be remediated for
unrestricted use or if institutional controls will be used.117 The
specific land use controls that will be used must also be identified in the inventory.118
Consistent with the general movement towards greater
transparency, EPA should require states to adopt the proposed
notification reforms discussed in this article. In addition, states
interested in qualifying for a “state response program” that is eligible for the federal enforcement deferral under CERCLA section 128 should be required to establish and maintain centralized
databases of sampling results under their cleanup programs,119
and provide the information to the public.120 Significant financial resources and time are expended duplicating phase two
investigations at sites that have been investigated in past transactions. If there was a centralized database, local governments and
private purchasers seeking to redevelop sites would not have to
waste money repeating investigative work.
Some consultants have expressed concern that creating
databases could expose them to liability. It is unclear how a
repository would pose any different liability than reports now
made available to the public for remedy selection by responsible
parties or parties participating in voluntary cleanup programs.
In any event, the concern could be easily addressed by requiring persons seeking access to the database to acknowledge a
disclaimer that the repository was for informational purposes
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without any warranty of accuracy. By acknowledging the disclaimer persons would also waive any claim of reliance upon the
information. Indeed, consultants already insert such disclaimer
language in their reports.

Clarify Continuing Obligations
EPA’s 2003 Common Elements memorandum was not particularly helpful on what constituted reasonable steps/appropriate care, although it did suggest that landowners that qualify for
the LLPs must take “some positive or affirmative steps” about
releases of hazardous substances.121 EPA should therefore issue
additional guidance elaborating on the kinds of actions that would
be considered in compliance with the continuing obligations. In
particular, EPA should reiterate the language in the preamble to
AAI that sampling is a critical component of exercising appropriate care.122 After all, it is hard to exercise care about contamination if one does not know of its existence. In addition, EPA should
indicate that source removal (e.g., removal of leaking tanks and
impacted soil) and other measures to eliminate potential exposures (e.g., installation of sub-slab depressurization systems to
eliminate vapor intrusion) should be considered to fall within the
scope of the continuing obligations.

Conclusion
The practice of environmental law for transactions involving contaminated properties has devolved to the point where
lawyers are facilitating a moral hazard. If the nation is going to
finally move beyond this legacy of contaminated sites, we need
to raise the level of what is considered customary due diligence
and disclosure. It is time to reject antiquated notions that arose
from our agrarian heritage and encourage practices that lead to
greater transparency reflecting the twenty-first century society’s
values in promoting public well-being.
Mandatory reporting of historical contamination is the best
long-term, sustainable approach to remediating these legacy sites

and reintroducing them into mainstream commerce. We need
to swing the pendulum back from reliance on a market-based
approach to cleanups towards a system with more enforcement
mechanisms, which provide the public with meaningful opportunities to discover contamination early and shape remedial
decisions in their communities.
Justice Brandeis once wrote that “sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”123 A recent New York Times article on contaminated meat
illustrates the potential power of improved disclosure.124 In covering shoddy oversight by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
the article revealed that slaughterhouses had adopted their own
version of “no look” contracts that prohibited their customers
from sampling the meat for E. coli, at the risk of being cut off
from further supplies.125 Once the existence of these agreements was disclosed, several large food chains discontinued this
practice.126
Contractual prohibitions on sampling, whether they are
imposed by slaughterhouses or sellers of contaminated property,
should be void as a matter of public policy and simply have no
place in the 21st century since they allow withholding of information that impacts the public’s health and welfare. Society
prohibits landlords from renting substandard properties, manufacturers from making defective products, and new housing
from voiding implied warranties. Similarly, EPA should lift current provisions that prevent sampling of potential and existing
property contamination as a matter of public policy.
We can list a “parade of horribles” why these suggestions
may not work, but it is clear that the current system is not working. We need to try some new and creative approaches. The
existing CERCLA reporting system is broken. Who would have
ever dreamed that thirty years after the passage of CERCLA we
would still be discovering sites contaminated decades ago? If we
do not change the system, our grandchildren will be discovering
sites contaminated by our grandfathers.
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